There were few small drones in service when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but now they are ubiquitous, used extensively by both sides for surveillance, artillery spotting and strike missions. Ukraine, with its culture of tech startups adapted quickly. More than 200 Ukrainian companies now supply military drones, backed by an ecosystem of non-profits and volunteer groups. Russia, with its rigid central control and addiction to monopolies has not moved as fast. But it does command far greater resources and the longer the war continues the more significant they become.
This is being called the first drone war; according to the General Schill, the French Army’s Chief of Staff, drones are now responsible for about 80% of the destruction. Is Russia gaining a lead in this vital area?
From Zero Drones To A Million
Samuel Bendett is an expert on Russian drones and adviser to both the CNA and CNAS thinktanks. His X/Twitter account is an invaluable window into the Russian side of uncrewed warfare, with a steady stream of translated material covering all views of the drone war, from the factory to the battlefront, from volunteers to miliary strategists. He talked to me about how Russia is adapting to the drone age.
Bendett notes that while in theory the Russian army started acquiring small military quadcopters back in 2021, there were few if any in service at the time of the invasion in February 2022. Some Russian militias in Donetsk used commercial quadcopters, but not regular forces, who found them unacceptable.
“Part of the official resistance to such purely commercial products had to do with these drones’ inability to withstand electronic warfare and other countermeasures as purely commercial products,” says Bendett.
Electronic jamming has been and continues to be an issue, with drones and jammers in a constant cat-and-mouse development race. Many commercial drones have been lost to jamming, especially in the early stages of the war, but enough complete their missions to make them essential assets.
Bendett says after years of this technology proving itself for both militaries, much of the Russian military now accepts small drones as a key asset. Production may now be as many as a million a year. But acceptance is still far from universal.
“Russian bloggers and volunteers note that some Russian commanders still do not understand the value of these drones, do not understand how such technology and small drone units fit into the larger force structure and are sometimes resistant to more widespread use of such technology at the tactical level,” says Bendett.
Parallel Production Process
This resistance has slowed down the procurement of small quadcopters. In fact, most do not come through military supply channels. (As we will see there is one big exception, the Sudoplatov group, which is a curious hybrid.)
“Most needs for tactical drones – quadcopters, FPVs, etc. – were, and continue to be, filled by volunteer organizations that procure them from China or assemble them from Chinese parts,” says Bendett.
He notes that in Russia, most acquisition, development, testing, evaluation and procurement of small drones and FPVs is by volunteers.
“The Russian military claims to have a small quadcopter procurement pipeline and there are apparently warehouses where such drones can be obtained,” says Bendett. But while the official media describes these warehouses there is little sign from military bloggers at the front of drones distributed this way.
“Many Russian commentators note that most FPVs used are assembled by volunteers and even soldiers themselves,” says Bendett. “Right there on the frontlines.”
He notes Russian volunteers say that they are delivering drones to their troops ‘in spite of and despite of’ government and Ministry of Defence involvement. Whether or not a unit gets drones often depends on whether the unit’s officers, or even soldiers, can connect with volunteer groups and establish a delivery pipeline.
“That’s why there is such a difference in quality and quantity of drones across the Russian frontline units,” says Bendett. “Some are well-equipped, while others simply lack drones, and that’s why there are daily requests for small drones from soldiers on their own Telegram channels, probably in violation of basic security measures (or OPSEC)”
Bendett notes that Putin himself recently ordered the Ministry of Defence under newly-appointed Defense Minister Belousov to work more closely with the volunteer groups. (Video below shows Putin taking a personal interest in a display of new drones) However, achieving this may not be so simple.
Unseating The Tsar’s Favorite
In feudal times, Russian Tsars tended to hand out monopolies to their favorites, regardless of merit. By far the biggest Russian producer of FPV drones appears to be the volunteer group Sudoplatov Battalion. This shadowy group has always been well-financed from ‘charitable donations’ and appears to have wealthy backers. The group produces the VT
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As their success grew, Sudoplatov succeeded in building a relationship with the Ministry of Defense and became an official supplier. The level of funding and terms of contracts are of course kept secret. But Russian practice is to have one supplier for a given weapon type, and Sudoplatov appears to hold a virtual monopoly.
“Sudoplatov is a sore topic among many Russian drone developers and volunteers, who openly resent them,” says Bendett. “Sudoplatov defend their efforts by saying they were the first to knock on all the ”right doors’ by doing the hard part, getting through the bureaucracy. But many volunteers, who have products that seem to be better than VT-40, think that a decentralized approach with diverse products for different missions would be better when it comes to drone development and use.”
This would be more like the Ukrainian effort, where many drone companies get government contracts to deliver a wide range of different drone types.
A particular objection to Sudoplatov is that the specification for the VT-40 was fixed last year. Since then, the Ukrainians have found out its operating frequencies and know how to jam it. Sudoplatov did not update the drone but simply stuck with the original specification. This is unlike Ukrainian drone makers who quickly switch frequencies in response to feedback from the field.
“Diversifying the supply of the same FPV drones by distributing purchases from many small garage workshops made it possible [for Ukraine] to avoid bureaucracy and a clumsy giant that is unable to quickly change control frequencies,” Russian drone fundraiser Two Majors commented on their Telegram channel.
“Sudoplatov drones still operate at the same frequency specified by the manufacturer, and the enemy successfully puts them down,” commented one Russian army instructor.
But Bendett says Sudoplatov’s grip may be weakening.
“Judging by what the Russian state media like TASS and RIA Novosti put out, there is now greater attention on many other drone projects such as Ghoul, Joker, Piranha, Gortenzia and others,” says Bendett.
Again though, the media reporting is not yet been reflected by reports fromt he field .
Size Matters. But So Does Quality
For all its failings, Russia is a huge country, and that translates into a lot of volunteers making a lot of drones
“It’s likely that the overall Russian efforts encompassing small drone development and production is greater than that of Ukraine,” says Bendett. “At the same time, even if the Russian volunteers can assemble north of 100,000 FPVs per month, many of these drones actually suffer from poor quality and lack of assembly standardization, many will not fly far when first launched, many will be lost of EW and other countermeasures.”
Shipping a massive number of FPVs each month does not automatically translate into results on the battlefield. The quantity of drones flying also depends on a number of drone operators – Bendett notes that even if Russian volunteers can assemble a lot of FPVs, only so many will be flown by a limited number of drone operators, who are also educated and trained by many volunteer efforts.
One startling statistic Bendett found recently was that 50% of Russian drones are brought down by Russia’s own jamming systems before they even reach Ukrainian lines. This is due to a lack of coordination between electronic warfare units and drone operators.
According to the military instructor quoted above, the build quality of Sudoplatov’s VT-40s is so poor that a third of them cannot even take off, further reducing the numbers. And when they do reach Ukrainian lines, the defenders are ready with jammers tuned to the right frequency to knock them out.
But even if the Russians avoid being jammed, they have not been able to use drones as effectively as their opponents.
As an example, Bendett quotes a post from prominent volunteer Aleksey Chadaev describing how a Russian FPV operator launching 30-40 drones a day and scoring zero hits was “a completely typical story at the front.” This is put down to a combination of poor training, weak tactics and a lack of co-ordination with reconnaissance teams. By contrast Ukrainian FPV operators quote hit rates of 20%-50% or more.
“Russians themselves also note a much better Ukrainian organization of drone units and better Ukrainian drone tactics and concepts, especially including group combination of heavy and light drones,” says Bendett.
He notes the Russians have been adept at copying Ukrainian drones and drone tactics, so it may be simply a matter of time before they catch up.
Drone War In 2024 And Beyond
Russia appears to be gradually getting its act together. Military quadcopter production has gone from nothing to perhaps 100,000 a month or even more – greater than any country except Ukraine. And social media means that, unlike in previous wars, the shortcomings of equipment are widely observed, analyzed, described and shared rather than covered up.
Meanwhile Sudoplatov, which had essentially siphoned money out of drone procurement and delivered substandard FPVs – behaving, in other words, like a typical Russian defence contractor— may be eased out of the picture, although for now, its relationship with the right MoD contacts and offices shield it from continued criticism.
Many Russian sources are already anticipating the next round of drone tech upgrades, in particular AI-enabled drones which are impervious to jamming and could operate in swarms. There are also interceptor drones, and drones able to work in coordination with ground robots in the development and testing pipeline.
Russia can only produce and scale such developments at speed if the bureaucracy can finally embrace volunteer groups and harness their expertise and creativity. Failure will mean watching Russian drones dropping like flies to ever-improving jamming while swarms AI-powered Ukrainian drones obliterate Russian forces.
“There is an attempt by the Russian government and the MoD to tap into existing volunteer and start-up community for ready tech solutions,” says Bendett. “Whether that will actually result in specific technology developments and adoption, or will be another missed opportunity, remains to be seen.”
Russians may be slow learners. But the longer the war goes on the more chance they have to learn and put their greater production capacity to use.
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